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In the wake of New Public Management reforms, the prospect of increasing task performance by 
building trust within public organisations has awoken renewed interest in the public sector. The focus 
has, however, predominantly been on strengthening leaders’ trust in employees by offering the latter 
greater autonomy, while employees’ decisions to accept and return trust have received less attention. 
The purpose of this article is to develop a conceptual framework for studying how interactional and 
institutional trust interplay when employees in public organisations respond to leaders’ attempts to 
build trust by offering them greater autonomy. The conceptual framework is applied to a case study 
conducted in Copenhagen Municipality, which is actively engaged in a reform to strengthen trust. The 
results support the proposition that the optimal conditions for employees to accept offers of greater 
autonomy occur when they experience both high interactional and high institutional trust. However, 
the case study also illustrates that other factors such as horizontal trust, professional confidence and 
available resources also affect employees’ willingness to accept offers of greater autonomy.  
 
Introduction 
“It is no use opening the birdcage if the bird is not willing to fly”.  
(Leader, Social Department) 
 
A well-functioning public sector with the ability to respond to ongoing changes plays a 
crucial role in society as a whole. In recent years, trust has become a vital issue in debates 
about the development of the public sector. The main focus of interest in trust has 
traditionally been on the importance of citizens’ trust towards the public sector, and vice versa 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Høyer & Mønness, 2016; Van de Walle, 2017). However, 
trust within the public sector among civil servants working together to handle organisational 
challenges is receiving growing attention in the wake of New Public Management reforms 
(Bouckaert, 2012; Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012). Theorists inspired by the New Public 




the public sector to heighten collaboration both internally and with actors outside formal 
organisations in order to develop new, innovative solutions (Klijn, 2016; Osborne, 2006; Six 
& Sorge, 2008; Torfing, 2016). This aspiration, it is argued, requires trust in public 
employees, who must be delegated a greater degree of autonomy in order to flexibly handle 
these new, complex tasks (Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012). Autonomy in this context can be 
defined as the discretion delegated to employees to make decisions (Verhoest & Peters, 2004). 
Trust in the context of public administration is mostly connected with leaders’ delegation of 
autonomy, while it is mainly assumed that when leaders offer public employees trust by 
granting them autonomy, they will automatically use it (Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011; Verhoest & Peters, 2004).  
However, contemporary trust research shows that building vertical trust is fundamentally a 
reciprocal process that involves risk – not only for the leader granting autonomy, but also for 
the employee accepting that autonomy (Long & Sitkin, 2014; Rousseau & Sitkin, 1998; Six, 
2018). Therefore, offering trust in the form of autonomy is no guarantee that public 
employees will take the risk of accepting it. Trust may even be regarded as a ‘poisoned 
chalice’  (Skinner, Dietz, & Weibel, 2014).  
Several factors are at stake in employees’ decisions about whether to return the invitation to 
trust. A substantial part of the trust literature conceptualises the development of trust as a 
micro-level, interactional  phenomenon based on direct contact between employees and 
leaders (den Hartog, 2003; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Lane, 1998; Rousseau & Sitkin, 1998). 
However, research has pointed out that processes of building vertical trust within 
organisations are also institutionally embedded (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Although the 
importance of both interactional and institutional aspects of trust is acknowledged in the trust 
society literature (Sitkin & George, 2005; Six, Nooteboom, & Hoogendoorn, 2010; Vallentin 
& Thygesen, 2017), only a few studies address trust at more than one level (Jonwitcz-
Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009; Kroeger, 2013).  Both conceptual and empirical studies that 
can shed light on how institutionally generated trust impacts behavioural practices in 
organisations are scarce (Bachmann, 2018). The process of introducing greater autonomy for 
public employees has been studied by some scholars (Borg, Verdonk, Dauwerse, & Abma, 
2017; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Langfred, 2004). However, the interplay between interactional and 




leaders’ offers of greater autonomy has been understudied in the context of public 
organisations.  
The purpose of this article is to help fill this research gap. The article explores how 
interactional and institutional dimensions of vertical trust interplay when public employees 
are offered more autonomy and must decide whether or not to return leaders’ invitations to 
trust. By integrating existing research on interactional and institutional aspects of vertical 
trust, the article develops a conceptual framework (Vertical Trust Model) that outlines four 
different conditions that shape whether employees accept offers of greater autonomy. The 
conceptual framework is applied to a case study from Copenhagen Municipality, that is 
actively engaged in an internal reform of trust. The case is extreme in the sense that Denmark 
is a high trust society (Bjørnskov, 2006; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2016). However, the case also 
offers rare insights into dynamics of vertical trust building that are relevant to many Western 
countries, which are similarly under pressure to reform the public sector in the wake of NPM 
reforms.  
The Vertical Trust Model builds on previous research which points out that both interactional 
and institutional trust have the ability to absorb the heightened risk connected with enhanced 
autonomy (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Six, 2018). Thus, the underlying 
proposition of the VTM is that employees are more likely to accept offers of greater 
autonomy under conditions of both high interactional and high institutional trust.  
The results of this study support that proposition. However, the results also point to other 
explanatory factors that affect the decision to accept greater autonomy, such as civil servants’ 
professional self-confidence, horizontal trust among colleagues, and limited resources. These 
findings help to explain when and why offers of autonomy can become ‘poisoned chalices’ 
for employees, and offer insights into how to optimise the conditions for developing vertical 
trust in public organisations.  
The argument proceeds as follows: in the first section, the theoretical framework is developed, 
and existing research on interactional as well as institutional trust is outlined. Next, a 
conceptual model of vertical trust comprising four different configurations of interactional 
and institutional trust is developed. Following that, the selection of the case and methods are 
accounted for. The conceptual model is then applied to a case study of Copenhagen 




employees. After the results have been presented, the limitations and potential of the findings, 
and their implications for future research as well as for practice, are discussed, and the results 
are summarised in the conclusion. 
Theoretical framework 
Trust can be defined as the willingness to accept the risk of making oneself vulnerable to 
another person or party. The decision to trust also depends on contextual risks that may affect 
the trustee’s ability to live up to the trust offered to him or her (Hardin, 2002; Möllering et al., 
2004; Nooteboom, 2003; Nooteboom, 2002).  Giving trust involves expecting that things ‘will 
be all right’ even though there is a risk that expectations might not be met and that things may 
‘go wrong’. If there is no risk, trust is essentially not needed (Bachmann & Zaheer, 2013; 
Luhmann, 2017; Möllering, Bachmann, & Lee, 2004; Rousseau & Sitkin, 1998; Schoorman, 
Mayer, & Davis, 2007).  
Trust relations in organisations can be categorised in terms of horizontal and vertical 
relations. A central difference between vertical and horizontal trust has to do with the balance 
of power between trustor and trustee (Eek & Rothstein, 2005). While horizontal relations of 
trust are characterised by equality in power, vertical trust relations, which are the focus of this 
study, are by definition asymmetrical regarding formal power. For example, trust between 
colleagues is horizontal while trust between a leader and an employee is vertical. 
The reciprocity of trust 
Trust can never be commanded but will always be dependent on the trustee’s willingness to 
accept the invitation to trust (Frost & Moussavi, 2011; Luhmann, 2017; Martin, 1999). 
Therefore, understanding trust-building processes requires approaches which capture both the 
invitation to offer trust and the acceptance and return of trust (Möllering et al., 2004). 
Building trust is fundamentally a reciprocal process between two parties, and starts with the 
trustor deciding to give trust and thereby accepting a larger degree of vulnerability towards 
the trustee. Some scholars argue that leaders, who possess the power to define their 
subordinates’ autonomy, have a special position when it comes to initiating the trust-building 
process (Luhmann, 2017; Mishra & Mishra, 2013). When a leader offers trust in the form of 
greater autonomy, the offer also involves increased complexity, potentially causing insecurity 
and a perception of heightened risk. Therefore, the consequences of trust are analysed by both 
parties. If trust is to grow, both must be willing to accept risk and engage in the trust-building 




offered is unwanted and will be received as though it were a poisoned chalice (Skinner et al., 
2014).  
Vertical trust, seen from the point of view of the employee, involves an increasing 
generalisation of trust in which interactional trust in one’s immediate leader is more concrete 
and built on interpersonal experience, while institutional trust in the organisation is more 
abstract, and draws more on generalised trust (Currall & Inkpen, 2002; den Hartog, 2003; 
Kroeger, 2013; Nachmias, 1985). In other words, employees’ vertical trust will draw on 
elements of both interactional and institutional aspects of trust (Luhmann, 2017; Möllering, 
2006; Newton & Zmerli, 2011).  
Interactional trust 
Trust as an interactional phenomenon between leader and employee has received substantial 
attention, with the focus predominantly on how to create trust in leaders (Dirks & Ferrin, 
2002; Frost & Moussavi, 2011; Martin, 1999; Park, 2011; Searle et al., 2011; Six, 2004).  
While some research focuses on the conditions under which, and the extent to which, leaders 
can trust their employees (Brown et al., 2015; den Hartog, 2003; Six, 2018), other theories are 
preoccupied with what leaders can do to earn their followers’ trust. There is relatively 
widespread agreement that subordinates who perceive their leader as competent, sensitive to 
his/her subordinates’ needs, benevolent, and with high integrity, are more likely to trust him 
or her (Bachmann, 2003; den Hartog, 2003; Nooteboom & Six, 2003; Schoorman et al., 2007; 
Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Robust leaders who are able to handle risk are 
also more likely to earn their employees’ trust (Connell, Ferres, & Travaglione, 2003; Dirks 
& Ferrin, 2002; Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000; Searle et al., 2011). Accessible and dialogue-
oriented leaders who delegate, engage with and involve employees also appear to build trust 
more easily with their employees (Bijlsma & Bunt, 2003; Nyhan, 2000; Searle et al., 2011). 
However, trust in leaders is also contextual: employees may trust their leader with regard to 
one task or context, but not another (Hardin, 2002; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Mishra & Mishra, 
2013; Nooteboom, 2003).  
Institutional trust 
While a substantial portion of the trust literature conceptualises the development of trust as a 
micro-level, interactional phenomenon based on contact between trustors and trustees, other 




areas of the trust literature define institutional trust in terms of societal trust in institutions 
(Fukuyama, 1995; Høyer & Mønness, 2016; Van de Walle, 2017), Bachmann & Inkpen 
define institutional trust as the institutional environment in which a trust relationship is 
embedded (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). In other words, institutional arrangements can reduce 
the risk of misplaced trust through legal regulation, codes of conduct, standards of 
employment contracts, organisational control, or other formal or informal behavioural norms 
(Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011).This study draws on this latter definition of institutional trust.  
Often, when a micro-level perspective is employed, macro-level factors such as institutional 
context are not recognised as more than external factors that perhaps have the capacity to 
disturb trust building between individuals. But both within trust research and neo-institutional 
theory, some scholars argue that the specific institutional setting in which people build trust 
with each other constitutes a vital, but often overlooked dimension of organisational trust 
(Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011;; Kroeger, 2013; Reed, 2001). Central to these perspectives on 
trust is the assumption that institutional trust plays a constitutive role to interactional forms of 
trust by providing both restrictive and formative elements.  
The trust‐control nexus 
A sub-field of research on institutional trust focuses particularly on the relationship between 
trust and institutional arrangements like control and regulation. Although trust and control are 
similar in their ability to reduce complexity, the mechanism through which they do this differs 
significantly: trust reduces complexity by excluding negative possibilities from consideration, 
thereby absorbing risk and enabling action. Control, on the other hand, attempts to minimise 
complexity by regulating and reducing possibilities for action (Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012; 
Möllering, 2006).   
While the relationship between control and trust has received substantial attention, the 
findings diverge when it comes to explaining how these phenomena relate (Weibel, 2007). 
Some research indicates that trust and control are unavoidable opposites that are in a 
subsidiary relationship in which trust removes the need for control, and vice versa (Bijlsma-
Frankema & Costa, 2005; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Grund & Harbring, 2009). However, a 
growing field of empirical research suggests that control and trust can complement each other 
constructively under certain conditions (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Costa & Bijlsma-




Thygesen, 2017; Weibel et al., 2016; Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2010). Public administration 
research on bureaucratic rules reaches similar conclusions about the dichotomy between trust 
and control: while some control is perceived as coercive ‘red tape’, other forms of control are 
better described as enabling ‘green tape’(Adler & Borys, 1996; DeHart-Davis, Davis, & 
Mohr, 2014). Highly regulated workplaces may experience high trust, while minimally 
regulated institutions may complain about low trust (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; van 
Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2011; Verhoest & Peters, 2004). The central point is that employees’ 
perceptions of controlling and regulatory arrangements are key to understanding institutional 
trust. 
Factors at stake in the trust‐control nexus 
Recent research has further clarified some of the factors determining whether institutional 
arrangements are perceived as trust-supportive or trust-obstructive (Bozeman, 1993; 
Kaufmann & Feeney, 2012; Le Grand, 2003; Scott & Pandey, 2000; Weibel & Six, 2013). In 
other words, control or regulation that are perceived as legitimate ways of avoiding antisocial, 
sub-optimising behaviour do not have the same motivational costs as control that is perceived 
as illegitimate (Schnedler & Vadovic, 2011; Six, 2013). According to self-determination 
theory, employees’ responses to formal control will also depend on the extent to which basic 
human needs such as autonomy, competence and a feeling of relatedness are supported in 
processes of organisational control (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In addition, 
informal and close relations between the controlling actor and the employee being controlled 
also create better conditions for building institutional trust (Six, 2013; van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 
2011). Several results show that employee involvement and participation in the development, 
implementation and daily use of organisational control create opportunities to express 
concern, include professional input, and build vertical trust (Bruijn, 2002; Costa & Bijlsma-
Frankema, 2007; Weibel, 2007).  
Hence, institutional trust reflects the extent to which institutional arrangements support or 
obstruct processes of interactional trust building (Sitkin & George, 2005; Vallentin & 
Thygesen, 2017).  
This article draws on this complementary understanding of control and trust, which means 
that employees’ subjective perceptions, rather than objective estimates of institutional control, 





In the following, the two dimensions are combined in a conceptual model that distinguishes 
four different combinations of low or high interactional and institutional trust.   
High interactional trust means that employees perceive their focal leader as trustworthy in a 
specific context, based on their competence, benevolent intentions, robustness and 
consistency. High interactional trust is expected to make employees more willing to make 
themselves vulnerable to the risk of heightened autonomy, compared to situations in which 
interactional trust in the leader is low.   
When institutional trust is high, employees perceive institutional arrangements as legitimate, 
purposeful and supportive. Contrarily, low institutional trust is associated with employees’ 
perceptions of institutional arrangements as being illegitimate, purposeless or unsupportive to 
processes of building trust.  
The Vertical Trust Model (VTM) is illustrated in table 1 and shows how levels of 
interactional and institutional trust create four different conditions that shape employees’ 







When both interactional trust and institutional trust are high, conditions for employees to 
willingly accept offers of greater autonomy are expected to be optimal, since high levels of 
both aspects of vertical trust help to absorb the perceived increased risk associated with 
expanded autonomy.  
When interactional trust is high but institutional trust is low, employees may be willing to 
make themselves vulnerable to their focal leader, but since institutional arrangements are 
perceived as obstructive, offers of autonomy are perceived as riskier to accept. Similarly, high 
institutional trust and low interactional trust are expected to be received hesitantly: although 
institutional arrangements are perceived as supportive, low trust in the focal leader makes it 
risky to make oneself vulnerable. Since one level of trust can assist in absorbing increased 
risk associated with greater autonomy while the other levels cannot, the conditions for 
accepting offers of greater autonomy are ambiguous.  
Finally, the combination of low interactional and institutional trust is expected to constitute 
the least optimal combination for employees to willingly accept the  autonomy offered to 
them, since no aspects of vertical trust can contribute to bridge the perceived heightened risk 
associated with these offers.  
The four combinations of employees’ perceptions of high and low interactional and 
institutional trust, respectively, provide a structure for analysing the empirical data. First, 
however, the case and methods chosen are described.  
Methods 
Empirically, the study addresses the findings from a case study conducted in Copenhagen 
Municipality, which is the largest public organisation in Denmark. As described earlier, the 
trust reform in Copenhagen Municipality is an extreme case in the sense that Denmark is 
considered a high-trust country (Bjørnskov, 2006; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2016). However, 
dealing with red tape and dysfunctional control in the wake of NPM reforms is also a highly 
relevant challenge in the broader context of Western public sectors. 
Copenhagen Municipality constitutes a unique case for studying attempts to build vertical 
trust in a public organisation given that, since 2012, the municipality has consistently pursued 
a so-called ‘trust reform’ which involves a clear ambition to build more vertical trust at all 
levels and across administrative areas. However, the sheer size of the bureaucracy in 




providing an optimal case for studying dynamics of vertical trust building in which several 
actors are involved at several levels (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
Given the scarce existing research on dynamics between institutional and interactional trust, 
the study is exploring rather than testen the VTM.  By exploring a tentative conceptual model, 
rather than just testing the model as a narrow hypothesis, the study is able to include and 
discuss factors beyond the two defined dimensions of the VTM. The study explores initiatives 
that attempt to build more vertical trust by expanding employees’ autonomy. This involves, 
for example, removing the need to clock in, less detailed requirements concerning how to 
solve tasks, and more economic autonomy. The common trait among these initiatives is the 
ambition to delegate and enhance employees’ discretion to make local decisions. Initiatives 
cover both large, centrally anchored projects, and smaller initiatives at the local level, and 
were studied across six administrative areas. The initiatives were located using the snowball 
method in which interviewed informants identified other relevant initiatives in the 
organisation. The selection of initiatives therefore reflects an ambition to maximise variation 
rather than to ensure representation. Thus, the data are rich in relation to the process of 
attempting to build vertical trust, but weaker when it comes to evaluating the ultimate effects 
of the various initiatives.  
The qualitative study draws on 65 semi-structured interviews with leaders, employees, 
administration, politicians, shop stewards and union members. The starting point for the 
interviews was informants’ experiences with concrete initiatives aimed at building more 
vertical trust. The interviews were semi-structured and constructed around a number of 
themes covering both institutional and interactional aspects. Interview guides were adjusted to 
fit the informants’ different roles and contexts. While the interviewed employees and union 
members only have experience as subordinates, local leaders and administration typically 
have experience of being both subordinates and leaders. To strengthen the validity of the 
study, the interviews were combined with an analysis of formal documents from the 
municipality, and observations from meetings and informal dialogues.  
The empirical data were coded in NVIVO. Given the specific focus in this article on 
employees’ conditions for accepting offers of greater autonomy, the focus is solely on one 
side of the reciprocal process, namely the subordinate as the recipient of an offer of trust. In 




greater autonomy. The analysis focuses on the decision faced by the subordinate. Specifically, 
it addresses how she or he assesses interactional and institutional aspects of vertical trust, and 
how this affects his or her conditions for accepting invitations of greater vertical trust.  
Since the study focuses on employees’ decisions about whether or not to accept trust, 
employees’ reflections about institutional and interactional trust are at the heart of the coding. 
However, leaders’ reflections on employees’ conditions for accepting trust are included as 
valuable empirical material. The empirical data were coded along the two dimensions in focus 
here: institutional and interactional trust. In addition, this coding was assessed and coded into 
the categories ‘high’ or ‘low’ trust along each dimension. Thereafter, a matrix coding was 
conducted in which the two dimensions were crossed. Mapping the distribution of the four 
combinations of institutional and interactional trust is outside the scope of this study. Rather, 
the aim is to explore how institutional and interactional aspects of trust interplay in 
subordinates’ decisions about whether to accept the autonomy offered by a leader. As 
variation and not representation was the central criterion for the selection of cases, the coding 
was solely used to illustrate dynamics in the four combinations of institutional and relational 
trust.  
In the following, the empirical data will be analysed using the four different variants of the 
conceptual framework in order to illustrate how interactional and institutional dimensions of 
trust interplay and create different conditions for accepting offers of autonomy.  
Findings 
While the concept of trust in focal leaders is relatable to most employees, their understanding 
of institutional arrangements varies across welfare areas and workplaces. Not surprisingly, the 
most heavily regulated areas, such as the Social and Employment Departments, have a more 
comprehensive picture of the institutional arrangements they are exposed to. However, their 
reflections on the purpose of control are often more nuanced, despite the challenges they 
experience in relation to institutional trust. In other words, the data support established 
insights from the trust-control nexus which show that perceptions of control, rather than 
objective levels of control, are key to understanding institutional trust (Costa & Bijlsma-
Frankema, 2007; Six, 2013; Weibel et al., 2016).  
The empirical material offers several examples of all the four different configurations of 




combination of low interactional and low institutional trust. This is perhaps not surprising 
given that the study draws on initiatives from frontrunner workplaces that are actively 
pursuing trust.  
In table 2, empirical examples in the form of quotes are presented to illustrate the various 




Table 2: Empirical illustrations of the four quadrants in the Vertical Trust model.  
 
Generally, the results support the fundamental proposition of this study: that a combination of 
high interactional and institutional trust creates more fertile conditions for employees to 
accept leaders’ invitations to build trust by offering them greater autonomy. However, as we 
shall see, levels of vertical interactional and institutional trust are not the only factors at stake 
in employees’ decisions about whether or not to accept such offers of autonomy.  
First, however, we will dive into each quadrant to explore the conditions that shape 





We start out in the upper right quadrant, which is characterised by high interactional trust in 
focal leaders, as well as high institutional trust. Generally, employees who experience a 
combination of high trust in both dimensions are positive about the increase in autonomy. In 
many cases, employees appear to have accepted the autonomy and have already made use of 
their new discretion: “I really appreciate that the field I can play on ... is bigger now. Now it 
is easier doing the things that make sense (Employee in the Health and Care Administration) 
In an employment center, meetings with unemployed citizens were formerly regulated in 
detail, with set standards about how many meetings should take place, and how long they 
should last. The leader changed this practice and instead gave employees the autonomy to 
conduct meetings flexibly according to their professional judgement. An employee explained 
that she was excited about this new opportunity and had already started making use of her 
increased autonomy both because the control system had been adjusted to support the new 
flexible meetings and also because ‘I know that there is enough trust between us… that my 
leader will support me.’ In this and many other examples, employees who make use of the 
autonomy offered to them emphasise the simultaneous importance of trust in their leader as 
well as supportive institutional arrangements.  
The way in which breaches of trust are handled is emphasised as crucial to employees’ 
willingness to accept offers of autonomy. Several employees stress the importance of leaders 
“having one’s back” in case they make mistakes. A leader in the social department elaborates: 
“It is essential that they feel they can come to me if they make a mistake. That they know they 
won’t get in trouble but that we will figure things out together”.  Trusted leaders are 
described as avoiding blame and sanctions, while ensuring collective learning from critical 
incidents.  
Institutional arrangements are seen as trust supportive, because they assist employees in 
handling high risks in their jobs: “Documentation helps creates a safety net for us. I also think 
documentation and control help us to learn and create transparency about what we are 
doing.” (Employee in Social Department). A key factor appears to be how leaders engage in 
dialogue with employees about institutional arrangements such as organisational control. A 




resources and tap into the experience they have. We need to involve them profoundly when we 
figure out how we should document things”  
Both employees and leaders, in these cases, stress that they debate, adjust and challenge 
institutional arrangements that they perceive as obstructive to their tasks.  
Low interactional trust ‐ High institutional trust 
In other cases, institutional trust is high while interactional trust in the focal leader is low. In 
these cases, employees generally perceive institutional arrangements as purposeful and 
legitimate. However, in these cases trust in the focal leader is simultaneously low. For some 
employees, low trust in leader is  based on concrete experiences of their leader as being either 
incompetent or not benevolent. A leader of a Health Care Centre describes her superior in the 
Administration: “It feels like she doesn’t care about us or the citizens. It’s all numbers. The 
relationship is so important!” Although leaders’ incompetence is also mentioned as a reason 
for low trust, lack of benevolence appears to be especially detrimental to employees’ trust in 
their leader.  
In other cases, low trust in a leader is simply a result of not knowing him or her well enough, 
either because the leader in question is perceived as distant, or simply because she or he is 
new to the organisation. An example of this pertains to a new leader in the Social Department 
who, in order to show trust, decided to stop requiring employees to clock in. Although this 
offer of greater autonomy was intended as a way of showing trust, a number of employees 
chose to keep registering their hours anyway because “Honestly, I don’t yet know if I can trust 
her”. Similarly, a physiotherapist who had been granted a greater degree of discretion to 
design training sessions more flexibly still followed the former detailed instructions that have 
now been formally abolished, because she was not sure if her leader would support her if she 
made a mistake.  
This and many other examples show that offering autonomy, even when institutional trust is 
high, is still received hesitantly if interactional trust is low. Employees may even hold on 
desperately to rules and procedures as a form of individual protection. Paradoxically, offering 
more autonomy can trigger the escalation of self-created restrictions and self-imposed 
controls, if trust in the leader is low. Thus, offers of autonomy without interactional trust 
appear to be only hesitantly accepted or are even rejected by employees, despite institutional 





In other cases, trust in the focal leader is high. Employees believe that their leader would 
(potentially) back them in case of trouble, and perceive him or her as competent and 
benevolent. However, institutional arrangements are perceived as obstructive, creating low 
institutional trust. This is the case, for instance, if control is perceived as time-consuming or 
simply not conducive to solving the tasks they have to undertake. In a number of cases, this is 
also associated with a fear of making mistakes: “Every time there is just a hint of something 
that could become a bad case in the press, the administration escalates common rules. This 
has created a culture of fear that still permeates the walls here” (Leader in the Social 
Department).  
Although several employees claim that they do trust their leader, they tend to find ways to 
decline offers of greater autonomy. “It is not only a question of having trust in my leader, but 
also the backup we get from the system”, a health care employee explains. Although they may 
feel backed up by their focal leader, they perceive the institutional arrangements to be 
unsupportive and fear that they might expose themselves to risky criticism if they accept 
offers of greater autonomy.  
Low interactional trust – Low institutional trust 
In a few cases, employees experience a combination of both low interactional trust in their 
focal leader and low institutional trust in organisational control. “We have experienced 
distrust from the administrative system and that, combined with bad local leadership, has 
created a really bad situation.”  (Employee in a local cultural institution). When employees 
neither trust neither their leader nor perceive institutional arrangements to be supportive, 
offers of greater autonomy are usually received with scepticism or are simply disregarded. 
There appears to be little inclination to risk the vulnerability associated with greater 
autonomy. For some employees, the ‘pretty words’ about trust at the level of policy ambitions 
stand in contrast to their daily experience of organisational life. An employee who has been 
offered extended autonomy in the form of more flexible documentation expresses his view on 
the Trust Reform: ‘This trust reform is “the emperor’s new clothes”!’ When both 
interactional and institutional trust are low, offers of greater autonomy are increasingly 
perceived as ‘poisoned chalices’ by employees, who see little point in accepting leaders’ 





Although employees certainly emphasise interactional and institutional trust as important 
foundations for accepting offers of more trust, the empirical data offer insights into a number 
of other factors at stake.  
An interesting finding is that the extent of the autonomy offered, may, in itself,  affect the 
conditions for accepting such offers among employees. In some cases, the autonomy offered 
is perceived as so insignificant that is not worth paying attention to. An employee in the 
Culture and Leisure department says: “These offers of more freedom end up being little things 
like letting us document stuff in a new system. If they want me to get on board it needs to be a 
little sexier than that!”  When offers of autonomy are perceived as too trivial, this can cause 
disengagement or disregard among employees, regardless of interactional or institutional 
trust. Modest offers of autonomy can even appear insulting if employees feel that they 
contrast too starkly with high ambitions about trust expressed by leaders. This dynamic 
appears to be reinforced if employees have previously been exposed to offers of autonomy 
which have been perceived as too insignificant to invest effort in.   
Conversely, there are also empirical examples of employees who find offers of autonomy too 
risky. While levels of interactional and institutional trust certainly appear to be part of this 
equation, several examples show that employees’ professional confidence to actually live up 
to the responsibility involved also plays a central role. An employee at a rehabilitation center 
says: “Sometimes it can be liberating to have a leader say: Just follow these guidelines. You 
don’t have to worry about the rest.” Thus, a central challenge for leaders is to ensure that 
offers of autonomy are significant enough for employees to want to get involved, while 
carefully tailored so that employees feel they are capable of handling the extra responsibility.  
Another frequently mentioned factor is the importance of available resources in the 
organisation. “Although they (the institutions) are keen to try out this new way of working 
more freely, they don’t necessarily have the resources to get started” (Consultant in the 
Social Administration). Several employees feel that when the budget is tight and their 
resources to solve tasks are cut back, it is hard to find the time and energy to embrace and 
explore the possibilities offered by greater autonomy.  
Both leaders and employees point out that willingness to accept autonomy also depends on 




explains: “It is not just about leadership, but also a question of the employees trusting each 
other. When I delegate a task, the employee needs to trust that her colleague, who is involved 
in the task, is also competent to solve it. It is also a matter of building trust horizontally”.  
This is a reminder that vertical trust is not isolated in the organisational context, but coevolves 
with trust in other important relations.  
Discussion & Conclusion 
This article set out to explore how interactional and institutional aspects of trust interplay in 
shaping employees’ conditions for accepting leaders’ offers of autonomy, and develops and 
applies a conceptual model of vertical trust (Vertical Trust Model). The results support 
previous findings in trust research, which show that offers of trust are not always received 
positively (Skinner et al., 2014). However, the study also makes an important contribution by 
exploring how both interactional and institutional aspects of trust interplay in the development 
of vertical trust. The development of the VTM can also be considered a valuable contribution, 
given that conceptual work about how institutional trust impacts behavioural practices in 
organisations is especially scarce (Bachmann, 2018). 
The Vertical Trust Model builds on previous research which points out that both interactional 
and institutional trust can help to absorb the heightened risk connected with enhanced 
autonomy (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Long & Sitkin, 2006;  Six, 2018). Thus, the 
underlying proposition of the VTM is that the likelihood of employees accepting offers of 
greater autonomy will be conditioned by levels of both interactional and institutional trust.  
The results of this study support that proposition. A number of leaders and employees in the 
case study compared the trust reform to the metaphor of ‘opening the birdcage’ in order to ‘let 
the bird fly’. However, as some respondents who have been deeply involved in the 
implementation of the trust reform commented: ‘It is no use opening the birdcage if the bird 
is not willing to fly’. Such experiences illustrate how it may be necessary, but not sufficient, to 
offer employees greater autonomy in order to build vertical trust. The results certainly show 
that if the ambition is to achieve high vertical trust, it would be helpful to strengthen both trust 
in leaders and institutional trust in order to ensure that employees actually make use of the 





The results help to explain why, and in which situations, offers of autonomy can become 
‘poisoned chalices’ for employees, and they also confirm the importance of considering both 
interactional and institutional dimensions of vertical trust building in public organisations. 
However, the study also suggests that the relationship between vertical and horizontal trust 
warrants further attention.. For example, trust in colleagues also appear to be affect subordinates 
willingness to grant vertical trust to superiors.   Could high horizontal trust, for example, 
absorb some of the risk connected with greater autonomy, even if trust in the leader is low 
(Costa, 2003; Costa & Peiro, 2009; Costa, Roe, & Taillieu, 2001)? Drawing on social capital 
theory, it would be valuable to gain more insight into the interplay between vertical and 
horizontal trust relations (Eek & Rothstein, 2005).  
Inspired by the finding that limited resources also play a part in employees’ willingness to 
engage in offers of greater autonomy, inertia and path dependency could also be explored as 
relevant mechanisms to explain employees’ hesitancy to accept greater autonomy (Sarigil, 
2015; Torfing, 2009; Weick & Quinn, 1999). Changes in well-established habits and 
procedures require focus and investment of resources, while continuing down a well-known 
path may appear easier and less stressful to some employees (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; May 
& Winter, 2009). If employees perceive that available resources are too scarce, their 
willingness to engage in time-consuming change processes involving greater autonomy may 
also decrease (Lipsky, 2010). Future research is therefore encouraged to address these, and 
possibly other relevant factors in processes of building vertical trust, that are beyond the scope 
of this study.  
Although the Danish case in this study is extreme in the sense that Denmark is known to be a 
high-trust country, many Western countries are experiencing similar challenges in the wake of 
New Public Management reforms. Thus, an improved understanding of multilevel processes 
of vertical trust building within the public sector is of broad relevance when it comes to 
supporting the development of public sector organisations in modern democracies.  
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